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I. Abstract 
 A variety of dynamic failure cases with 
regional impact were described at a bump 
symposium held in 1958.  These types of events, 
while rare, are of particular interest because 
their ability to impact a large area has disaster 
potential.  These cases can be grouped into two 
broad classes of events by mechanism.  These 
are (1) slip along steeply dipping faults and (2) 
fracturing of strong strata above, or below, the 
coal seam.  Both failure modes produce 
dynamic or “shock” loads on the perimeter 
(roof, rib, floor) of mine openings.  Special 
consideration should be given to these failure 
modes in planning of deep coal mines since 
their occurrence is not within the professional 
experience of many contemporary workers, and 
their potential is not evaluated by many of the 
analysis tools commonly used to evaluate 
hazards in coal mine plans.   
II. Introduction 
Local pillar bumps and outbursts of coal are a 
concern in many coal mines, and have received 
considerable attention from industry and 
regulators.  Sudden, dynamic failures with 
regional impact have been much less common.  
This is important, since the bump cases reviewed in 
this paper show that a bump with regional impact is 
not simply a large version of a local bump – it may 
well be caused by a different mechanism.   
Given the rarity of regional scale bumps, a long 
view is needed to capture case histories and 
insights into these phenomena.  The historical 
literature is marked by periods of relatively intense 
interest in such events, often in response to 
particularly damaging or disastrous occurrences.  
This literature gives a variety of names to these 
events, including bounces, district bumps and 
shock bumps, that often imply a particular 
mechanism, at least with respect to a particular 
mine or district.  The general term “regional scale 
bump” is used in this review to avoid implicit links 
to these mechanisms.    
A Bump Symposium held at the 1958 Annual 
Meeting of AIME marks one historical era of 
heightened interest in regional scale bumps.  The 
introduction to this symposium defines the term 
“mountain bump” as the “sudden rupture of one or 
more coal pillars under excessive stress” and goes 
on to say that these “bursts occur with varying 
degrees of violence and sometimes include 
adjacent strata, especially the bottom rock.”  The 
problem is characterized as “extremely 
complex” and preventative measures, to be 
successful, must be “based on a thorough study 
of conditions in the individual mine.”  This 
characterization remains appropriate, although 
the discussion predates modern longwall 
mining.  However, longwall mining was a topic 
of considerable discussion in 1958, primarily as 
a means to control bumps through caving.  
Thomas (1958) credits the late George S. Rice, 
former chief mining engineer of the U.S. Bureau 
of Mines, with being an early advocate for 
“open-ended” longwall mining which had been 
“most successful in combating the bump hazard 
in mining coal under deep cover, especially in 
Great Britain.”   
The Symposium Proceedings, published in two 
successive issues of Mining Engineering, are 
preceded by a summary titled “Progress in 
Control.”  This title is consistent with the 
optimistic tone of many of the published papers, 
including one titled “Coal Mine Bumps Can Be 
Eliminated.”  Confidence within the Bureau of 
Mines, in particular, had been sufficiently high 
that there was a ten-year pause in bump research 
dating from Rice’s retirement until 1951, when 
three bumps involving fatal injuries occurred.  
This over-confidence was further underscored 
by the 1958 Springhill bump disaster, which 
claimed 75 miners. 
The waxing and waning of interest in bumps, 
particularly regional bumps with disaster 
potential, is likely a result of their rarity.  This 
rarity means that few mining professionals can 
apply personal experience to evaluation of their 
potential in practice.  As such, there is a real 
danger of ignoring these types of events, 
analogous to the ever-present temptation to 
build on that 100-year flood plain. 
As in 1951, and 1958, we are reminded that 
bumps of regional scale, while uncommon, have 
not ceased.  This paper looks at historical 
descriptions of bumps with regional scale, in the 
hope that by investigating dynamic failure modes 
with potential to create the next disaster, that 
disaster might be averted.  Such a pursuit is central 
to the mission of the National Institute for 
Occupation Safety and Health (NIOSH) – and of 
great concern to our partners in industry, labor and 
academia.  This paper presents the beginning of an 
effort to address this issue – stated as: 
“How do we evaluate and manage the disaster 
potential of various modes of regional scale 
dynamic failure in deep coal mines?” 
The 1958 Symposium papers describe a variety of 
regional scale bumps that can be sorted into two 
broad classes of events that were caused by (1) slip 
along faults in the overburden and (2) fracturing of 
strong strata above, or below, the coal seam.  Both 
failure modes produce dynamic loading of mine 
opening perimeters.  In the first case, dynamic 
loading is typically described as widespread 
shaking, particularly along a fault trace.  In the 
second, loading is described as an impact generated 
by sudden failure of hard strata.  Treatment of 
these two modes by the 1958 symposium is 
reviewed here.  
III. Fault-Slip Bump Cases 
The first set of regional bump cases were selected 
from events reported by Peperakis (1958) as related 
to the Sunnyside fault zone.  Two types of bumps 
are described, localized bumps at the face that 
occurred during mining in close proximity to the 
fault, apparently as stress concentrations were 
encountered, and widespread shaking of main 
accessways by slip within the fault zone.  This 
review focuses on the later.  These bumps typically 
occurred a great distance from active pillar 
workings and were associated with faulted 
structures.   
Peperakis describes terrain above the Sunnyside 
Mine as “exceedingly rough.”  Overburden depth 
increases quickly, reaching 2000 ft of 
overburden within 2700 ft of the outcrop.  Much 
of the overburden consists of massive sandstone 
but the immediate roof is described as 
“generally very poor.”  Seismic shaking of the 
immediate roof and ribs by large fault slip 
events accounts for a large portion of the 
damage.  The floor is a strong massive 
sandstone bed 20 to 50 ft thick.  Faulting is 
described as “very extensive” with maximum 
displacements of 33 to 90 ft.   
The Sunnyside fault lies along a roughly 3.5 
mile southeast trend, subparallel to the strike of 
bedding with displacement reported to be 30 ft 
(Clark, 1928).  Osterwald et al (1993) report on 
more recent mapping of the northwest-trending 
Sunnyside fault zone (figure 1).  They describe 
the fault zone as follows: 
“… a belt of fractures about 1930 m (1.2 miles) 
wide in the southern part of the [Sunnyside] 
district, but it narrows to a single break in the 
northern part of the district.  It dips almost 
vertically, and the stratigraphic separation 
across the zone is commonly about 9 m (30 ft).  
The southwest side is downthrown.”  
Peperakis (1958) reported the occurrence of 
“extremely violent bumps near the intersection 
of the main slopes of No. 1 mine with the main 
Sunnyside fault” and concluded that “most of 
the really severe bumps that have struck the 
workings in recent years have taken place close 
to the main Sunnyside fault.”  Many of these 
bumps produced widespread shaking of the 
mine (and surface, in many cases), suggestive of 
fault slip movement.  Recurring damage to 
slopes (main accessways) well outby the mining 
front was an added source of concern.  Many of 
these bumps were described in detail at the 
symposium.  A selection are summarized here. 
The first occurred in December of 1944 with the 
mine almost entirely on development (i.e. little 
or no pillar mining).  A major seismic event 
“initiated working of a 350-ft section of roof that 
caved over the ensuing 45 minutes.”  Other slopes 
were described as “badly shaken” but did not cave.  
A similar event eight years later, in November of 
1952, was felt through most of the mine and on the 
surface, causing extensive rib sloughage in the 
slopes, in some cases extending to the portal. 
 
Figure 1  The main Sunnyside fault zone in the Sunnyside 
1,2 and 3 Mines (after Osterwald, 1993).  Inset is a map of 
mining to 1958.  Shaded area is 4 sq. miles of worked out 
or first mined coal seam (after Peperakis, 1958). 
The 1944 and 1952 bumps were followed by a 
succession of four similar major events in 1957.  
The first two, on January 24th and 27th, caused 
considerable damage to the main slopes, including 
heaving of 1300 ft of track entry, caving of roof 
along 550 ft of main slope entries and an additional 
500 ft of main slope where heavily bolted roof 
“settled on the bolts.”  In addition, top coal was 
shattered along 2000 linear feet of entries and 
widespread entry roof “breakage” was reported. 
 Figure 2   Sketches by Holland (1958) illustrating two variations of his proposed bump mechanism (not to scale).  Top, 
failure of a pillar remnant suddenly transmits stress to the mining front.   Bottom, failure of a strata lever that has 
reduced stress on the coal seam at B fails, suddenly increasing stress at B while reducing stress on coal at the mining 
front. 
A similar pair of events occurred in December 
of 1957.  The first induced bursting of 220 feet 
of “main slope pillar,” filling the manway with 
rock and badly shaking the main slope.  Heavy 
support, including roof bolts, 12x12 inch 
crossbars and cribs, was credited with 
preventing damage.  The second was a violent 
bump that was recorded by men “working at 
four points along three different fault planes” 
with a lateral extent of 7000 ft. 
Peperakis identified strong or well-reinforced 
roof as the key to prevention of damage and 
accidents in “all areas subject to bumps” at the 
Sunnyside Mine.  Support suggestions included 
roof bolts in combination with cribs, crossbars 
on cribs, and 16-in diameter props, augmented 
by the “steel yieldable arch type of support” in 
slope areas and haulageways.  This emphasis on 
roof support is a particular, local conclusion 
aimed at preventing damage from seismic 
shaking of the “generally very poor” roof rock 
at the mine. 
IV. Strata-Failure Bump Cases 
The second set of regional bump cases was 
selected from events reported by Holland (1958) 
and Campbell (1958) as related to failure of strong 
strata above and/or below the coal seam.  This 
group of regional scale dynamic failures is 
characterized by widespread damage outby the 
retreat line – with or without damage on the line.  
The location of damage behind the mining front 
while, in some cases, the mining front remains 
unaffected, has been attributed to strong strata 
acting as a lever sitting on a fulcrum which is the 
mining front.  Failure of the lever then causes 
impact loading of the coal seam behind the mining 
front. 
Herd (1930) provides an early version of this 
explanation in the context of the Springhill Mine as 
follows (pp. 178-179):  
“This sandstone, being very strong and compact, 
has not the ability to fall or shear until a very 
considerable area has been excavated, during 
which time it is hanging back in the waste 
supported on a fulcrum at the coal face, 
resulting in an upward stress in this band and 
those above, reaching far over the solid coal.  
When this band finally breaks somewhere back 
in the waste, or possibly only slips very slightly 
on a fracture, the cantilever effect ceases, the 
rocks in upward strain over the coal are subject 
to a sudden reversal of stress and the coal ahead 
of the face is struck a sudden and hammerlike 
blow… This may explain damage up to 1350 ft. 
ahead of the wall faces…”   
Holland (1958) also described (and illustrated, 
in figure 2) how failure of hard strata might 
cause impact loading of large areas behind the 
pillar line (or working face in a longwall 
method).  He describes impact loading as 
follows: 
“… impact loading, which comes about because 
stratified mine roof spans an opening by acting 
as a  series of beam or plates.  Such structures 
impose high stress in support areas and perhaps 
relieve stress in areas behind the support.  Then, 
as illustrated in figure 2, the failure of such a 
beam or plate or a failure of its support (such as 
a pillar or pillar remnant) can cause a high 
impact load on the pillar adjacent to the failed 
support, or, if the roof beam actually fails, on an 
area behind the pillar.  Action such as this may 
cause a rock burst at the pillar line or at a place 
considerably removed from a pillar line.” 
Holland also cautions that “this mechanism has 
not been comprehensively analyzed” – a caveat 
that still applies.  Indeed, no convincing analysis 
of this mechanism is known to the authors, 
despite the availability of sophisticated 
numerical modeling tools.  Nonetheless, this 
concept continues to be the “state-of-the-art” 
description of this type of bump in 
contemporary works (e.g. Peng, 2008). 
Holland presents a number of bump cases from 
which he deduced this mechanism, including a 
large event that caused extensive damage behind 
the pillar line while leaving the pillar line 
undamaged (figure 3).  
Campbell (1958) provides a number of similar 
bump cases from the Springhill Mine.  The first of 
these occurred Dec. 6, 1924 (figure 4).  Damage, 
marked by crosshatched zones and letters, occurred 
primarily in levels developed on strike, and was 
described as “rails were thrown up against the roof 
by the eject coal and pavement [floor] strata.”  This 
case differs a bit from Holland’s example in that 
that pillars were not fully developed before retreat.  
Also, the damage is reported as originating from 
failure in the floor, rather than the roof.   
 
 
Figure 3    A very large district bump described by 
Holland (1958) spared the pillar line but produced several 
thousand tons of debris in areas behind in this un-named 
mine. Shading on pillars adjacent to the gob in this 
drawing show active mining.  Orientation was not given. 
Holland began with the assumption that the 
strong, brittle stratum that drives failure forms 
the immediate roof.  However, the proposed 
mechanism is equally plausible for a key 
bridging stratum located in the floor, at least 
until the gob develops sufficiently to confine the 
floor.   
Longwall mining was introduced at Springhill in 
August of 1926 with starting of the 220 ft wide 
5700 and 5900 East longwalls (Herd 1930), in 
an attempt to control bump hazards.  Longwalls 
were developed on dip with levels (gateroads) 
developed on strike for access to the wall.  On Oct. 
12, 1928, an event damaged a level for a length of 
1350 ft, starting a little more than 150 ft from the 
wall, which was not affected.  As was the case in 
1924, damage was characterized by “ejected coal 
and pavement [floor],” suggesting the basic 
district-bump mechanism had not changed with the 
change in mining method.  In general, Campbell 
(1958) found that “the most dangerous zone was on 
the levels for a distance of several hundred feet 
from the face.” 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Location of damage from a large bump at Springhill Mine, Dec. 6, 1924.  Damage to levels is marked by 
crosshatched zones and letters.  After Campbell (1958). 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper presents historical cases of large 
bumps with regional impacts on coal mines that 
fall into two classes by mechanism.  These are 
(1) slip along faults in the overburden and (2) 
fracturing of strong strata above, or below, the 
coal seam.  While these general mechanisms 
have been identified, detailed understanding is 
lacking.  Both failure modes produce dynamic 
loading of mine opening perimeters (roof, rib, 
floor) and both impact areas outby the retreat 
line.  The character of dynamic loading, 
however, differs significantly.   
 In the first case, the low frequency seismic 
shaking over large areas is typical of mining 
induced seismic slip of a pre-existing fault.  
Peak particle velocities in such cases are 
relatively low and can be handled by many 
support systems, even those dating from 1958, 
as is evident in recommendations put forward 
by Peperakis. 
In the second case, the relatively severe but 
more focused impact loading is typical of 
seismic rupture of hard, brittle rock.  The high 
frequency component of dynamic loading 
creates high peak particle velocities that 
challenge support not specifically designed for 
such loading.  Even the best support is often 
reduced to controlling rather than preventing 
damage.  Application of the recommendations 
put forward by Peperakis in this case would be 
relatively futile.   
Other regional scale failures have been 
addressed by companion papers, including a 
review of sudden floor heave events in deep 
western coal mines (Maleki et al, 2009), and a 
review of large scale collapse of overburden 
over evaporite mines, many of which involve 
overburden remarkably similar to that over 
some deep coal mines (Whyatt and Varley, 
2008).  The possibility of other mechanisms is 
being investigated. 
All of these mechanisms need to be considered 
when examining potential bump hazards in deep 
coal mines, particularly those mining within 
hard strata.  While uncommon, these 
mechanisms are well represented in the 
historical record.  The next step is to apply 
modern geomechanics tools, particularly 
numerical methods, to gain a better 
understanding of these mechanisms, factors that 
influence the likelihood of occurrence, and their 
control.  This step is being undertaken by an 
ongoing NIOSH research project with the 
assistance of collaborators in industry and 
academia. 
While more needs to be done to fully understand 
these mechanisms and incorporate this 
understanding into the design of mines, it is 
clear that the more we can understand the causes 
and effects of these mechanisms, the better we 
can anticipate, provide protection from, and 
reduce the chances of, their occurrence. 
The focus on mechanism is a characteristic of 
modern rock mechanics.  In part, this is a 
reflection of advances in our ability to compute, 
but it is also a realization that all rational ground 
support criteria depend on failure mechanism.  
This applies to empirical as well as analytic 
methods.   
The empirical approach is well-tested and 
useful.  It is not, however, independent of 
mechanism.  Rather, it collects successes and 
failures for common conditions with the implicit 
assumption that the failure mechanism (or 
mechanisms) is consistent.  Any departure from 
common conditions and failure mechanism(s) 
may invalidate the empirical rule.   
Bieniawski (1989, p. 66) addresses this issue by 
describing the data base underlying empirical 
rock mass classification systems he reviews and 
states “The data base used for the development 
of a rock mass classification system may 
indicate the range of its applicability.”  Peng 
(2008, p. 249), in discussing empirical pillar 
design formulas: “the reliability and 
applicability of the formula selected depends on 
the quality of, and range of mining and 
geological conditions covered by, case histories 
used in the calibration.” 
Control mechanisms are, necessarily, also 
closely linked to failure mechanism.  This link 
may be implicit if the control mechanism has 
been developed by trial and error, or if it is 
specified by an empirical criteria, but the danger 
of extrapolation holds nonetheless.  Put plainly, 
application of the wrong control mechanism to a 
given failure mechanism may increase, rather 
than decrease, the hazard to miners. 
These cases show that rare but potentially 
disastrous bumps are caused by mechanisms 
different from local pillar bumps and outbursts, 
and can originate outside the coal seam.  In 
other words, regional scale bumps are not 
simply large versions of local pillar bumps and 
outbursts.  Protecting against these regional 
scale events, then, requires explicit 
consideration of other mechanisms.  Thus, at the 
fiftieth anniversary of the 1958 Bump 
Symposium, it is appropriate to review these 
rare but potentially disastrous types of bumps. 
VI. Postscript 
The threat posed by regional scale bumps was, 
sadly, underscored shortly after the 1958 
symposium by a truly catastrophic bump in 
October of that year at the Springhill Mine.  
Campbell (1958) set the stage for this event in 
the conclusion to his paper as follows: 
“To date some 500 bumps have been recorded 
in No. 2 mine.  Many miners have been injured, 
and too often lives have been lost.  It has been 
fortunate that in most cases bumps have 
occurred when men were absent from the 
affected areas.” 
He also notes “three retreating longwalls – the 
13,000, 13,400 and 13,800 walls – are in 
operation today.”  These walls were operating in 
hard strata under up to 4,350 ft of overburden. 
Fortune ran out for the No. 2 mine on October 
23rd of 1958, when a disastrous bump hit levels 
accessing all three walls, and portions of the 
faces, killing 75 miners.  Notley (1984) 
described the damage as follows: 
“The final bump occurred at 8:06 p.m. and 
affected all three longwall faces.  The pavement 
of the four levels leading to the faces was 
heaved for up to 400 feet from the face and coal 
bursting from the ribs completely filled the level 
for distances ranging from 90 feet on the 13,400 
level to 434 feet on the 12,600 level.  On the 
longwall faces the floor had heaved, smashing 
many of the timber packs, and in some places 
raising the conveyor pans to the roof.  Coal 
burst from the face completely filled most of the 
face area.” 
Survivors were rescued from pockets along the 
face at the levels, after arduous excavation of 
heavily damaged levels (figure 5).  This bump 
was later examined in a Ph.D. thesis 
summarized by Notley (1984), but the 
mechanism, including any similarity to those 
proposed for earlier events by Herd (1930) and 
Holland (1958) was not explored. 
 
Figure 5   Plan view of damage (shaded regions) 
caused by the 1958 Springhill bump which claimed 75 
lives.  Survivors were rescued from relatively 
undamaged pockets at intersections between the 
longwall and the upper two levels.  Gob was located 
above and to the left of the walls shown.  The sketch 
was made by Dr. Arnold Burden (2008), a Physician 
assisting in the rescue, is not to scale.  North is to the 
left in this sketch.    
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